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Introduction
Institutional procedures play a vital role in legislative decision-making. In this regard, the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) closed-rule divide-the-dollar game is one of the most widely used legislative bargaining models to study distributive politics and government policy-making. 1 It has some methodological advantages over the models used in social choice theory. For instance, since it utilizes non-cooperative game theory, equilibrium existence is guaranteed even if the core is empty. In fact, in the game we analyze here, where a …xed surplus is divided under majority rule, the core is indeed empty. This feature of the Baron-Ferejohn model makes it very convenient to study various institutional aspects of political economy.
We believe that it is important to know as much as possible about a workhorse model like Baron and Ferejohn's. In this study, we focus on a particular feature of this model, namely the multiplicity of equilibrium strategies. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) show that any outcome (meaning any division of the dollar) can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) using in…nitely nested punishment strategies as long as there are at least …ve players and the discount factor is su¢ ciently high. They then restrict attention to stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in which the continuation payo¤s for all structurally equivalent subgames are identical. This restriction allows them to obtain a unique payo¤-equivalent equilibrium. 2 However, even with SSPE, equilibrium strategies cannot be uniquely determined.
The key elements of this multiplicity problem can be highlighted with the following example. Consider a country with a parliamentary system that needs to select its new government with majority rule. None of the political parties can achieve a majority on its own, and therefore, they need to form a coalition government. 3 Now suppose the head of state appoints a random party the right to form a coalition. 4 If we adapt the Baron-Ferejohn model to this example, it predicts that the proposer will form a minimum winning coalition, that the …rst proposal will be accepted, and that the set of equilibrium payo¤s for the parties involved can be uniquely calculated. However, it does not tell us the composition of the winning coalition. In fact, there are multiple mixed strategy equilibria each of which involves a di¤erent set of parties as coalition partners selected with di¤erent probabilities. 5 The multiplicity of SSPE arises from the ‡exibility to choose the randomization probabilities with which proposers select coalition members. It is possible to show the multiplicity of equilibrium strategies via examples. One case in hand is provided in footnote 16 of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) . However, no formal proof has been provided. In that paper as well as the ones that follow, the main emphasis is on equilibrium payo¤s. Our aim in providing a formal proof is to shift the focus to equilibrium strategies.
In this paper, we …rst provide a formal proof of the multiplicity of equilibrium strategies for a general n-player symmetric Baron-Ferejohn game (Proposition 1). 6 This proof, while useful on its own, also enables us to establish three important properties that SSPE must satisfy (Lemmas 1-3). We believe these are very useful results for any applied theorist using the Baron-Ferejohn model. We also provide, for expositional purposes, an example with three players that highlights some of the properties and restrictions SSPE have to satisfy.
One of the reasons the original Baron-Ferejohn game allows a very large set of mixed strategy SSPE is the ex ante symmetry of the players. Important asymmetries may create incentives for players to choose some of the coalition members with pure strategies. One example is when some of the players have veto power. Veto players are decision-makers whose agreement is required to adopt a new policy. Since every elected proposer must make each veto player a member of the winning coalition, the set of equilibrium strategies substantially shrinks when there are veto players. In Section 3 of our paper, we investigate the e¤ects of introducing veto players on equilibrium multiplicity in the Baron-Ferejohn model. We provide the conditions under which the game has a unique SSPE in terms of not senior, experienced, 'elder statesman'). 5 The formation of coalition governments can be quite uncertain with respect to which party will be included in the coalition (see Müller and Strøm, 2000; and Laver and Scho…eld, 1998) . 6 A similar exercise for the open-rule version of the Baron-Ferejohn game is done by Primo (2007) .
only payo¤s but also players'equilibrium strategies. Agents with veto power exist and play an important role in decision-making processes. In this respect, we believe that analyzing the e¤ect of veto players on equilibrium characteristics of the Baron-Ferejohn model is valuable.
Throughout the analysis, we use the coalition government example we introduced above to highlight our results. All formal proofs for the general n-player game are relegated to the appendix.
The Baron-Ferejohn game
A q-quota rule symmetric Baron-Ferejohn game is an in…nite-horizon sequential multilateral bargaining game with the following structure. Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng denote the set of players (n > 3 and odd). At the beginning of the game, one of the n players is randomly selected (equivalently, recognized) with equal probability 1 n to make a proposal for the division of $1.
x i 1g denote the set of feasible allocations, where x i is the share player i receives. In addition, denote u i as the utility of player i and assume that utility is linear in money such that u i = x i , 8i.
Once a proposal is made, each player simultaneously votes and if the proposal x 2 X receives q votes, 1 < q < n, it is accepted and the game ends. 7 Otherwise, the game proceeds to the next period in which another player (possibly the same) is randomly selected to make a proposal. This process continues until an agreement is reached. If no agreement is ever reached, each player receives a zero payo¤. When voting on a proposal, players compare their current payo¤ with the alternative of continuing to the next period. 8 All players discount the future at a common rate of 1.
We are now ready to describe the solution concept. Let H t be the history of the game that contains identity of the proposers, proposals that have been put forward and actions taken up to period t. A feasible action a i t (H t ) for player i in period t can be described as follows In the following theorem, we rephrase Theorem 1 of Eraslan (2002), which characterizes the set of SSPE.
Theorem 1 Let player i 2 N denote the proposer and x i j represent the share she allocates to the j th player. Then, the set of SSPE can be described as follows:
where
where V j represents the equilibrium continuation payo¤ of player j and is given by
In the above expressions, 
Proof. The proof is provided in Eraslan (2002) and thus omitted.
Notice that in an SSPE, a proposer makes an allocation of $1 such that it will be accepted by exactly q 1 other players besides herself since she wants to maximize her own share of the dollar. In other words, she o¤ers a positive share to only q 1 other players, thereby forming a minimum winning coalition. As a result, we can interpret those players who receive a positive share as coalition partners. To formalize this idea, consider the following. For any i 6 = j, let p ij represent the probability that i th player, as a proposer, gives j th player its discounted continuation payo¤
In other words, p ij represents the probability that player i includes player j in the winning coalition. 10 Given the randomization probabilities p ij , it is possible rewrite equation (1) as
10 An example may be helpful. Consider a 5-player game with q = 3, and assume that player 1 is the proposer. There are 6 possible coalitions that player 1 may form: Thus, V j denotes the payo¤ the j th player expects to get if she votes no to the current proposal, and the bargaining is carried over to the next period. We establish a useful property of continuation payo¤s in our …rst lemma.
, where V j is as given in equation (1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
In other words, the equilibrium continuation payo¤s of the players must add up to the total size of the surplus to be shared. As a result, Lemma 1 makes clear that there is no waste. Moreover, given the symmetry of the players, we can state our second lemma.
Lemma 2 Given that all players are symmetric, their equilibrium continuation payo¤s must be equal, i.e.,
Therefore, as long as there is symmetry among players, each player's expected share is equal. In the next lemma, we show that the equilibrium strategies are balanced (see Baron and Kalai, 1993); i.e., all players have an equal probability of being included in minimum winning coalitions when added up over all proposing players.
Lemma 3
In every SSPE, the probability that player j is included in a winning coalition is given by
. In other words, SSPE strategies are balanced.
Given Lemmas 1-3, we can state our …rst main result.
Proposition 1
The set of randomization probabilities fp ij g in a q-quota rule symmetric
Baron-Ferejohn game is not singleton.
One solution to the symmetric Baron-Ferejohn game, for instance, has all players choosing each possible minimum winning coalition with an equal probability (this in turn implies that
). Another solution involves, if we imagine players placed around a circle, each player choosing the q 1 players on her right with pure strategy.
To make the exposition clear and highlight some of the above results, focus on a 3-player game with q = 2 (i.e., three-player simple majority rule game). Recall the example we considered in the introduction about a country with a parliamentary system. Assume now that there are three political parties (players) with equal number of seats in the parliament (thus no party has majority control). A coalition government needs to be formed and assume that in accordance with the number of seats they hold, each party has an equal chance to be the formateur. 11 To form a coalition government, the formateur party needs one other party's support and assume that in accordance with Riker's size principle (Riker, 1962) , only minimum winning coalitions are formed, i.e., all-party coalitions do not occur.
Using equation (3), the continuation payo¤ of each party can be written as
In light of Lemma 2, we have
. Therefore, equations in (4) become
11 One key uncertainty about coalition government formation can be the designation of a formateur. Diermeier and Merlo (2004) analyze formateur selection process for 11 parliamentary democracies over the period . They conclude that the data supports the proportional selection, where formateurs are selected randomly proportional to the distribution of seat shares in the parliament as suggested by Baron-Ferejohn model. Furthermore, given that each proposer needs one other vote to obtain majority support, we must have
Equations (5) and (6) imply that p 12 = p 23 = p 31 . 12 As a result, randomization probabilities are not uniquely determined. Put another way, the probabilities that a given party will be chosen as a coalition partner are not unique. However, this is not to say that any con…guration of randomization probabilities is consistent with SSPE behavior. In particular, in this 3-player example, if the 1 st player elects the 2 nd player k% of the time in a given SSPE, then the 2 nd player must be electing the 3 rd player, and the 3 rd player must be electing the In the context of Baron-Ferejohn framework, there are other papers that employ veto power. Winter (1996) examines the change in veto players'power (payo¤s) with respect to a change in (i) the negotiation length (deadline) and (ii) the number of non-veto players.
Primo (2006) with absolute veto power. We have followed this approach since our focus is speci…cally on the equilibrium multiplicity rather than the general e¤ects of veto players, such as coalition size, payo¤s, etc.
There are applications of veto players in other venues, too. Consider, for example, an indivisible asset to be traded. Assume that this asset is jointly owned by r individuals (sellers) and that there are n r potential buyers, where 1 r < n. Assume also that the sale of this asset will create surplus for both sides but how this surplus will be shared depends on the relative position of the sellers and buyers. In this example, the quota rule is r + 1 and there are r veto players since the asset cannot be sold unless all of the sellers agree to it. As can be seen from these examples, veto power and veto players are quite relevant and vital part of any decision-making.
Our focus is the e¤ect of veto players on a speci…c equilibrium characteristic of the Baron-Ferejohn game, equilibrium uniqueness. Let us describe the new game in more detail.
Consider an n-player, q-quota rule symmetric Baron-Ferejohn game with r veto players such that 1 r < q < n. 13 The set of SSPE for this modi…ed game can be described as in is the same and strictly smaller than the equilibrium continuation payo¤ of veto players,
We can categorize players into two groups, veto and non-veto. Lemma 4 establishes that the continuation payo¤s are identical within each group, and that the continuation payo¤ of veto players is strictly larger than that of non-veto players. The next lemma provides the necessary condition for equilibrium uniqueness.
Lemma 5 In a q-quota rule Baron-Ferejohn game with n players, all of whom have equal recognition probabilities and r of whom have veto power, a necessary condition to obtain a unique SSPE (not only in terms of payo¤s but also in terms of players'equilibrium strategies)
is to have r = q 1.
We are now ready to state our second main result.
Proposition 2 A q-quota rule Baron-Ferejohn game with n players, all of whom have equal recognition probabilities and r of whom have veto power, has a unique SSPE (not only in terms of payo¤s but also in terms of players'equilibrium strategies) if and only if q = 2 and r = 1.
Thus, when an agreement requires only two players'consent (q = 2), the existence of a single veto player gives us a unique solution not only in terms of payo¤s but also in terms of strategies. This result is valid for any n > 3. In the context of the asset example mentioned earlier, if the asset is owned by a single seller who faces many potential buyers, then the resulting SSPE will be unique. This is true since the sale of the asset requires the consent of the seller and one of the potential buyers.
To highlight this result, we continue to use the coalition government example we considered before but this time we assume that one of the three parties has veto power, say party 1. One way to motivate this is the presence of strong ideological di¤erences between parties.
Assume that there are three parties with equal seats and also assume that two of these parties would not form a coalition with each other due to opposing ideological views. 14 This makes the remaining third party the veto player, which can form a coalition with others. 15 In addition, we continue to assume that only minimum winning coalitions occur.
Using equation (3) and noting that p 21 = p 31 = 1, the continuation payo¤ of each party can be written as
Using Lemma 4, we have V (8) and (9) necessarily imply
Equations (10) and (6) . Moreover, solving equations (7), (8) and (9), we obtain
.
A straightforward comparison establishes that
Recall that the standard Baron-Ferejohn game does not generate a unique SSPE due to the multiplicity of equilibrium strategies, i.e., multiplicity of the randomization probabilities p ij . 16 In this new game with one of parties having veto power, we reach a unique SSPE also in terms of equilibrium strategies since both p 12 and p 13 are uniquely determined. 15 Other examples outside the coalition government context prevail as well. One such example is the amendment of Canadian Constitution, which is provided in Winter (1996) . The British Parliament had the veto authority to overturn any proposal for the amendment of Canadian Constitution between the years 1867 and 1982. This veto power was changed in 1982 with another rule which required that the proposal for amendment must be supported at least two-thirds of the provinces in Canada and also that the supporting provinces must have 50% of the population. At that time, Ontario and Quebec together had more than 50% of the population. That means they together had a veto power without constituting a winning coalition. Another example is from …nance, called "golden share". Golden share grants minority shareholders veto rights on certain issues in shareholders'meetings. 16 Note that in the standard Baron-Ferejohn game, continuation values are uniquely determined.
When q = 2 and r = 1, each non-veto player is bound to choose the only veto player as a coalition partner with pure strategy. Moreover, since we need that non-veto players have equal continuation payo¤s in any SSPE, the veto player, as a proposer, must equally randomize between the non-veto players. From the results obtained in the proof of Proposition 2, we can state the following.
Remark When q > 2, the minimum number of veto players required to obtain a unique SSPE (not only in terms of payo¤s but also in terms of players' equilibrium strategies) is n 1, which is not viable given that r < q < n.
Thus, when q > 2 there are many SSPE that di¤er in terms of randomization strategies.
The underlying reason is similar to the one in the original Baron-Ferejohn model. We know from Lemma 5 that a necessary condition to obtain equilibrium uniqueness is r = q 1.
This automatically implies that for q > 2, we must have r > Having veto players introduces an ad hoc constraint in the bargaining game that changes the composition of randomization probabilities. Therefore, a one-to-one comparison between the non-veto and the veto games in terms of equilibrium multiplicity is di¢ cult. One way to examine the e¤ect of introducing veto players is to compare the number of equations with the number of unknowns. Without any veto players, there are (n 1)n unknowns (n 1 possible randomizations for each of the n players) and 2n 1 linearly independent equations (n 1 equations implied by the construction of continuation payo¤s given in equation (3) and n equations implied by the property of balanced strategies -please see the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3, and Proposition 1 for more details). With veto players, the number of unknowns decreases to (n 1)(n r) when r < q 1 (n r 1 possible randomizations for each of the n r non-veto players, plus n r possible randomizations for each of the r veto players) and to r(n r) when r = q 1 (n r possible randomizations for each of the r veto players). Similarly, the number of equations decreases to 2n 1 r when r < q 1 and to n 1 when r = q 1 (again follows from the construction of continuation payo¤s and the property of balanced strategies -please see the proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5, and Proposition 2 for more details). 17 Another way to examine the e¤ect of introducing veto players is to see how it narrows down the number of possible coalition formations. In a q-quota game with r veto players, each veto player's problem is to o¤er an acceptable payo¤ to each one of the remaining r 1 veto players, and to an additional q r players from the pool of n r non-veto players. Hence, the total number of possible coalitions that a veto player can form is , each non-veto 17 The discontinuity at r = q 1 is due to the fact that when r = q 1, non-veto players have no choice but form the winning coalition with veto players alone besides themselves.
player has a substantially smaller number of possible winning coalitions to form.
Conclusion
This paper …rst presents a formal proof of the multiplicity of equilibrium strategies in the original (symmetric) closed-rule Baron-Ferejohn game. In doing so, we also establish important properties that stationary subgame perfect equilibria must satisfy. We then analyze a new version of the game by introducing veto players. Agents with veto power exist and play an important role in decision-making processes. We show that when the quota rule is 2, the existence of a single veto player provides us with a unique equilibrium not only in terms of payo¤s but also in terms of strategies. We highlight our results using a coalition government example, where two of the three political parties needs to form an alliance to establish the new government. We believe that these results will be of great interest to applied theorists using the Baron-Ferejohn model.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. This can be seen analytically by summing equation (1) 
Next, using equation (2), we obtain
so we have
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider an n-player game with q-quota rule, where 1 < q < n. In this game, in any winning coalition, there will be q players including the proposer. Without loss of generality, order the continuation values such that V 1 V 2 ::: V n . First, suppose that V n 1 < V n . By Lemma 1, this implies that V n > 1 n . Since player n has the highest continuation value, she is in a winning coalition only when she is the proposer. This means
We can continue in the same fashion until we reach player q (in other words, the last one we analyze is V q < V q+1 = ::: = V n ). This establishes that
After that, we continue as follows. Assume that V q 1 < V q . This implies that V 1 < 1 n . In this case, players 1, 2,... , q 1 are always in the winning coalition and they will be o¤ered a payo¤ of V 1 , V 2 ; ::: V q 1 as a coalition partner. Thus, using equation (11), the …rst player's continuation payo¤ can be written as
In addition, using Lemma 1 and equation (11), we obtain
Next, substituting equation (13) into equation (12), we get
Simplifying the above equation gives us
Since V q > 0, this is a contradiction to the claim that V 1 < 1 n . Therefore, it must be the case that V q 1 = V q . We can continue in the same fashion until we reach player 1 (meaning that the last one to check is V 1 < V 2 = :::V q ). This establishes the result.
Proof of Lemma 3. In a q-quota symmetric Baron-Ferejohn game, the probability that player j is included in a wining coalition is given by
In what follows, we will determine the value of n P i6 =j p ij . Lemma 2 implies that each player is always o¤ered the same share whenever she is in a winning coalition (except for when she is the proposer). Thus, using Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and equation (3), we obtain
, for all j = 1; 2; :::; n, or
Notice also that
There is a total of (n 1)! (q 1)!(n q)! possible coalitions the i th player may form when she is the proposer. All of these possibilities occur with certain probabilities which add up to 1, i.e., P j 2C j g j ( j ) = 1. In addition, we know by de…nition that
Hence, equation (15) becomes n P i6 =j p ji = q 1, for j = 1; :::; n.
(16)
Using equation (14),
18 Consider our previous example given in footnote 10, where n = 5, q = 3, and player 1 is the proposer. Recall that: p 12 = g . This implies
Hence,
Proof of Proposition 1. This result directly follows from Lemmas 1, 2 and 3. We already know from Lemma 2 that
. Thus, what remains to be determined are n(n 1) randomization probabilities (n 1 possible randomizations for each of the n players). We have n 1 linearly independent equations given by equation (14), and n equations given by equation (16) . Since n(n 1) > 2n 1 for any n > 3, the solution to randomization probabilities is not unique.
Proof of Lemma 4. First, note that Lemma 1 is still valid. Consider an n-player game with q-quota rule, where q < n. There are also r veto players, with r < q for quota rule to be e¤ective. In this game, in any winning coalition, there will be q players including the proposer. Without loss of generality, assume that players 1; 2; :::; r are veto players and players r + 1; r + 2; :::n are non-veto players. In addition, order the continuation values of non-veto players such that V r+1 V r+2 ::: V q ::: V n . First, suppose that V n > V n 1 .
Since player n has the highest continuation value among non-veto players, she is in a winning coalition only when she is the proposer. This means that V n = 1 n (1
! . Note that the second term in this expression may be positive, for instance, when q = n 1, or when q is smaller but V n > V n 1 = ::: = V 1 . Given our ranking of continuation payo¤s, it must be true that 1
in Theorem 1 is violated. In simple terms, both proposers n 1 and n choose the same least-costly way of obtaining support for their proposal. But this implies that V n V n 1 , a contradiction. Hence, V n 1 = V n . We can continue in the same fashion until we reach player q (in other words, the last one we analyze is V q < V q+1 ). This establishes that
After that, we continue as follows. Assume that V q 1 < V q . This implies that
. In this case, in addition to veto players, players r + 1, r + 2,..., q 1 are always in the winning coalition and they will be o¤ered a payo¤ of V r+1 , V r+2 ; ::: V q 1 as a coalition partner. Thus, using equation (17), player r + 1's continuation payo¤ can be written as
In addition, using Lemma 1 and equation (17), we obtain
Next, substituting equation (19) into equation (18), we get
Similarly, we can write veto player i's continuation payo¤ (where i 2 f1; 2; :::; rg) as
Furthermore, using Lemma 1 and equation (17), we obtain
Next, substituting equation (22) into equation (21), we get
If we compare equations (20) and (23), we see that
for any i 2 f1; 2; :::; rg.
Therefore, the initial requirement that
If we look at equation (20), we see that
, since V q > 0, a contradiction. Thus, we must have V q 1 = V q . We can continue in the same fashion until we reach player r + 1 (in other words, the last one we analyze is V r+1 < V r+2 ). So far, we have
Given equation (24), we can write veto player i's continuation payo¤ (where i 2 f1; 2; :::; rg)
as
In addition, using Lemma 1 and equation (24), we obtain
Next, substituting equation (26) into equation (25), we get
Since equation (27) 
Notice also that for a veto player i and a non-veto player j, it is true that
ik , for i = 1; :::; r,
n P k6 =j k=r+1
jk , for j = r + 1; :::; n.
For each veto player, there is a total of (n r)! (q r)!(n q)! possible coalitions she may form when she is the proposer. All of these possibilities occur with certain probabilities which add up to 1, i.e., 
Similarly, for each non-veto player, there is a total of (n r 1)! (q r 1)!(n q)! possible coalitions she may form when she is the proposer. All of these possibilities occur with certain probabilities which add up to 1, i.e., 
Furthermore, since for all non-veto players continuation value is the same as indicated in Lemma 4, and the …rst term on the right hand side of equation (28) is also the same due to equation (32), the second term must be the same as well, implying n P k6 =i p ki = n P k6 =j p kj for all i, j = r + 1; :::; n and i 6 = j.
Note that using Lemma 1 and equation (23), we can uniquely determine V veto and V .
For the randomization probabilities, the necessary condition to obtain uniqueness is that r = q 1. To see this, assume in contrast that r < q 1. In this case, we need to solve for (n r 1) randomization probabilities for each one of the (n r) non-veto players. In addition, we have (n r) randomization probabilities for each one of the r veto players, thus a total of r(n r) + (n r)(n r 1) unknowns. On the other hand, we have r equations implied by equation (31), (n r) equations implied by equation (32), and (n r 1) equations implied by equation (33), thus a total of n + (n r 1) equations. In order to have the number of unknowns smaller than or equal to the number of equations, we must have r(n r) + (n r)(n r 1) n + (n r 1), or r > n 1 1 n 2 .
Given that r < q 1 and that r < q < n, we need to consider n > 3 only. However, in that case, the above requirement becomes r > n 1, which is not feasible since r < q < n.
Proof of Proposition 2. In light of Lemma 5, we can restrict our attention to the case where r = q 1. The right-hand side of equation (32) is zero for all for j = r + 1; :::; n.
Hence, p jk = 0 for all k 6 = j and j = r + 1; :::; n. This leaves us with (n r) randomization probabilities for each one of the r veto players, thus a total of r(n r) unknowns. On the other hand, we have r equations implied by equation (31), and (n r 1) equations implied by equation (33). 19 In order to have the number of unknowns smaller than or equal to the number of equations, we must have r(n r) r + (n r 1)
) r 1 or r > n 1.
Given that r < q < n and r = q 1, the only possible way to obtain uniqueness is when r = 1, and q = 2.
